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Over the past decade or so, increasing attention has been paid in two separate 
disciplines to questions about realism and ontological commitment. The disciplines are 
analytic metaphysics on the one hand, and theology on the other. In this paper, I shall 
discuss two arguments for the conclusion that realism in theology and metaphysics—that is, 
a realist treatment of doctrines in theology and metaphysics—is untenable.1
‘Realism’ is variously defined in the literature. For purposes here, I shall adopt the 
following characterizations:
 where ‘x’ is a singular term, realism about x is the view that there is a y such that x = y 
 where ‘F’ is a putative kind-term, realism about Fs is the view that there are Fs and
that F is a genuine kind-term
 where ‘T’ refers to the linguistic expression of some claim, theory, or doctrine, to 
interpret or treat T realistically is (a) to interpret T as having an objective truth-value 
(and so to interpret it as something other than a mere evocative metaphor or 
expression of tastes, attitudes, or values); and (b) to interpret T in such a way that it 
has realist truth-conditions—i.e., it is true only if realism about the xs and Fs putatively 
referred to in the theory is true.
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2 where ‘D’ refers to a discipline (like metaphysics or theology), realism in D is or 
involves interpreting the canonical statements of theories or doctrines in D realistically.
Thus, one way to be an anti-realist about God, say, is to affirm explicitly that there is no such 
being as God; but another way to be an anti-realist about God is to say, for example, that 
‘God exists’ expresses a truth, but that the truth it expresses isn’t that there is an x such that 
x = God.  Likewise, one way to be an anti-realist about beliefs, say, is to affirm explicitly that 
there are no such things as beliefs; but another way to be an anti-realist about beliefs is to 
offer paraphrases of belief-talk according to which ‘there are beliefs’ expresses a truth, but 
the term ‘belief’ doesn’t pick out a genuine kind of mental state.  Furthermore, in light of the 
above characterizations, theists and atheists alike can interpret the same theological claims 
realistically. Indeed, their disagreement will most perspicuously be expressed as a 
disagreement over the truth value of the claim ‘God exists’ realistically interpreted.     
One motivation for doubting that we should interpret doctrines in metaphysics or 
theology realistically is the vague worry that practitioners of both disciplines are spinning out 
theories with no reliable way of determining which of the competing theories is true.  The 
worry is that the practitioners of each discipline are simply talking past one another, that their 
"debates" lack substance, and that their theories don't tell us anything of interest about the 
world or its inhabitants.  In short, theorizing in both disciplines is but idle word play; and so it 
is doubtful that the theories in either discipline have objective truth values or truth values with 
realist truth conditions. 
Those caught in the grip of this worry then face the question of what to do with 
metaphysics and theology.  In the case of metaphysics, the verdict is often that we should 
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3simply view it as a game and either stop playing it or else leave it to weekends and spend our 
day jobs on more serious activities—like, perhaps, philosophy of science. Theology is more 
complicated because many of the objectors still want to maintain that there is some value in 
religion, and they recognize that the sentences typically taken to express the core doctrines 
of religions like Christianity still have some value even if they can't be taken with literal 
seriousness. Indeed, whereas the objectors to metaphysical realism tend also to be objectors 
to metaphysics in general, the objectors to theological realism often style themselves as 
people interested in saving religion from the pernicious influence of modernism, 
fundamentalism, onto-theology, or other villains.  Still, for many of us, theology is of far lesser 
interest and import if the anti-realist verdict is allowed to stand.  If, in the end, the theories 
produced by theology are not fitting objects for belief, it is hard to see why we should take the 
discipline very seriously.
In this paper, I want to examine two ways of making the vague worry more precise.  In 
God and Realism,2 Peter Byrne offers an argument against realism in theology that is readily 
modified to cut against realism in metaphysics as well.  And in The Empirical Stance,3 Bas 
van Fraassen offers an argument against the very practice of analytic metaphysics that is 
both readily seen as an argument against realism in metaphysics and easily adapted into an 
argument against realism in theology.  In what follows, I will examine these two arguments 
and defend four conclusions:  first, that Byrne’s argument is answerable; second, that van 
Fraassen’s argument is unanswerable if we adopt what he calls the “empirical stance”; third, 
that there is (and can be) absolutely no reason why metaphysicians or theologians ought to 
adopt the empirical stance; and, finally, that for those who don’t adopt the empirical stance, 
van Fraassen’s objections can be answered in precisely the same way as we answer 
Byrne’s.
4The paper will have three sections. In section one I briefly present and respond to 
Byrne’s argument against theological realism. In section two, I present van Fraassen’s 
argument against analytic metaphysics and I show how, if sound, it constitutes a reason to 
reject both metaphysical and theological realism. In section three, I show how van Fraassen 
can be answered. Obviously what I am doing here falls far short of a full-blown defense of 
realism in either metaphysics or theology.  But the objections raised by van Fraassen and 
Byrne are tokens of a type of objection that I think is rather widely endorsed among those 
who are suspicious of these two brands of realism.  Thus, responding to those objections 
constitutes an important first step in the direction of a defense.
1. BYRNE’S ARGUMENT
Peter Byrne sums up his argument against theological realism as follows:4
1) All disciplines of thought that can be interpreted realistically show the accumulation 
of reliable belief.
2) Theology does not show the accumulation of reliable belief.
3) Therefore, theology cannot be interpreted realistically.
Byrne declares that this argument is “simple” (162) and “decisive” (161).  As a matter of fact, 
however, it is no simple matter at all to figure out precisely what Byrne means by terms like 
‘interpreted realistically’ or ‘show the accumulation of reliable belief’; nor is it a simple matter 
to figure out why exactly he thinks that the two premises of the argument are true. Since time 
will not permit the sort of detailed exegetical discussion it would take to sort out the 
terminological issues, I will simply offer glosses that I think are faithful to what Byrne was 
aiming at.  I will then try to reconstruct as best I can his defense of the premises. Readers 
who think that the resulting product is not something Byrne would be happy with are welcome 
to take the argument of the present section as one of my own invention (albeit inspired by the 
5work of Byrne and others) and offered primarily as a prelude to the discussion of van 
Fraassen in sections 2 and 3.
Byrne seems to think that to interpret a discipline of thought realistically is just to see it 
as the sort of discipline whose methods of inquiry are successfully aimed at truth, whose 
theories are grounded in and responsive to evidence, and whose conclusions are intended to 
tell us the literal, objective truth about the world. (Cf. Chapter 1, passim and, especially, pp. 
155 – 159.)5 Thus, those disciplines which we can interpret realistically in Byrne’s sense are
presumably just those disciplines whose theories we can sensibly interpret realistically in my 
sense.  
Byrne also seems to think that a discipline shows the accumulation of reliable belief
just in case it generates an increasing number of statements that we can rationally expect not 
to be contradicted by future well-established theories in the discipline. (Cf., especially, pp. 
159 – 161.)  Reliable beliefs in a discipline D are just those beliefs that can be expected to 
remain permanently sanctioned by D’s theoretical apparatus.6 To say that a belief is reliable, 
then, is not to say that it is likely to be true (though it might in fact turn out that the reliable 
beliefs of a discipline are just the ones that are likely to be true).  Rather, it is just to say that it 
is unlikely to be overturned by future evidence or theoretical developments.
Given all of this, Byrne’s argument might be restated as follows:  Consider some 
discipline D.  We can take D’s theories as worthy of belief and as aiming to tell us the literal 
truth about the world only if the practice of D over time generates an increasing number of 
statements that we can rationally expect not to be contradicted by future well-established 
theories in D. But we don’t find such an increase of “reliable belief” in theology. Thus, we 
should not treat theological theories as worthy of belief or as aiming to tell us the literal truth 
about the world.  And, we might add, what goes for theology also goes for metaphysics: we 
6don’t find the accumulation of reliable belief in that discipline either.  Thus, we should not be 
realists about theories in metaphysics either.   
So much for the argument.  Now, what shall we think of the premises?  Let us begin by 
observing that neither of the premises is obviously true. A relatively narrow discipline that hits 
on the truth right at the outset will show no accumulation of belief at all; but that by itself is not 
obviously a reason to doubt that it is to be interpreted realistically. Thus, there is prima facie 
reason to think that premise (1) is false. Moreover, many branches of theology within 
Christendom seem clearly to have shown the accumulation of reliable belief (as defined 
above) over the centuries.  In the Catholic Church, for example, the Nicene Creed and the 
Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent—to name just two of a variety of doctrinal 
standards within Catholicism—are not at all likely to be contradicted by future developments 
in (official) Catholic theology. The Nicene Creed and the Canons and Decrees of the Council 
of Trent are explications of and elaborations on doctrines that the Catholic Church claims to 
have found in scripture. They were needed precisely because their contents were not 
explicitly part of Christian belief prior to their formulation—so, in other words, they constitute 
genuine theoretical developments rather than being, like the scriptures, mere sources for 
theological reflection.  Though plenty of Roman Catholics, including Roman Catholic 
theologians, disagree with them in part or in their entirety, the Catholic Church is set up in 
such a way that we can be virtually certain that they will not be contradicted by future 
established theories in official Catholic theology. Likewise, and for similar reasons, it is highly 
unlikely that either the Nicene Creed or the Westminster Confession will be contradicted by 
future developments in (traditional, orthodox) Presbyterian theology—here not because the 
Presbyterian church is set up so as to guarantee that those doctrinal standards will be 
preserved, but rather because theology as it is practiced by those with a traditional, orthodox 
bent is not at all revisionary in the way that certain other brands of theology might be.7 And, of 
7course, similar things might be said for various other sectarian theologies.  Thus, there is 
prima facie reason to reject premise (2) as well.8  What then are Byrne’s arguments for these 
premises? 
Premise (2), oddly enough, is offered without any argument at all.  Byrne simply 
declares that it is obviously true, and then follows that declaration with remarks that 
effectively just restate and elaborate on it.  Thus, he writes:
Consider this question: do we know anything more about God than we did at the 
dawn of  Christian theology nearly 2,000 years ago? Answer: No. During that 
period many theological theories have come and gone in Christian thought, but 
there has been no accumulation of insight and discovery whatsoever.  The stock of 
reliable beliefs about the Christian God, about its attributes and plans, has not 
increased one iota. … Theology has not possessed intellectual traditions and 
modes of discovery [analogous to those in science] to enable its practitioners to be 
open to influences from divine reality and its practitioners have not been put in 
cognitive contact with divine reality. The academic discipline of theology is simply 
not productive of reliable beliefs about God—or about anything else for that matter.  
It cannot be understood realistically. QED. (162)
But why should we believe any of this? The stock of reliable beliefs about the Christian God 
has not increased one iota?  Again, it is hard to take this claim at all seriously in light of what 
we know of the histories of Catholic theology, traditional Prebyterian theology, and any of a 
number of other sectarian theologies within Christendom. The ‘QED’ at the end of the 
paragraph seems, to put it mildly, a bit premature.
Premise (2), then, is a natural target for resistance.  But for present purposes I want to 
waive worries about premise (2) and focus instead on premise (1).  Here Byrne does want to 
offer argument; though what the argument amounts to, exactly, is rather hard to tell.  What he 
8says explicitly in favor of (1) is just this:  “Premise (1) has been established through 
consideration of the example of science.” (162)  What we find, however, upon reviewing his 
consideration of the example of science is that, really, he has defended not (1) but (1a):
(1a) Disciplines that show the accumulation of reliable belief are to be interpreted 
realistically.
And what he offers in support of (1a) is just a version of the familiar “no miracles’ argument 
for scientific realism.  In his words:
The story of science is a human story, but one which is comprehensible only if we 
assume that human theory and practice are being in part, at least, shaped by what 
the world is really like.  If there is a progressive, cumulative structure to the 
development of science, this strongly suggests real-world cognitive contact and 
influence; otherwise the accumulation of reliable belief would be the merest 
accident.  (156)
A generalization on this argument yields (1a); but it yields nothing close to (1).
Nevertheless, there is an argument for (1) lurking in the neighborhood. Suppose we 
endorse the following premises:
(1b) For any discipline D, there is no initial presumption that D is to be interpreted 
realistically.
(1c) There can be no evidence supporting a realistic interpretation of a discipline 
apart from the accumulation of reliable belief.
(1d) Absent an initial presumption for interpreting a discipline D realistically, and 
absent evidence that D is to be interpreted realistically, D cannot rationally be 
interpreted realistically.
If we do endorse (1b – 1d), and if we are persuaded by Byrne’s argument for (1a), then we 
have a ready argument for (1).  
9The idea, then, is something like this: For any discipline D, the practitioners of D aren’t 
entitled simply to adopt, without argument, a realist interpretation of D. Rather, if we want to 
interpret D realistically, we need to do so on the basis of evidence—evidence that D is really 
putting us in touch with the truth about things. But what evidence could we possibly acquire?  
In the case of science, we have (allegedly) the accumulation of reliable belief. And it is, one 
might think, very hard to explain how we could have that if science weren’t putting us in touch 
with the truth about things. But absent the accumulation of reliable belief, what other 
evidence could we have for interpreting science realistically? What other phenomenon would 
be best explained by the supposition that science, or any other discipline, is putting us in 
touch with truth? Apparently none. Thus, the only disciplines that we are entitled to interpret 
realistically are those that show the accumulation of reliable belief—which is just to say that 
premise (1) is true.
The trouble with this line of reasoning is just that, if it were sound, we would face the 
threat of global skepticism. Let D be the discipline of Detecting Reliable Beliefs (DRB).  (If 
you prefer, you could treat it as the discipline for detecting success, and then fill in your 
favorite criterion for success.  But since we’re talking about Byrne, we’ll focus on his.)  
Practitioners of DRB—all of us, I suppose, to some extent or another—are engaged in the 
enterprise of trying to find out which, if any, of their beliefs count as reliable.  Moreover, if 
Byrne is correct about the criteria for interpreting a discipline realistically, realism about any 
other discipline is predicated in part on a realist interpretation of DRB.  That is, unless we 
assume that the claims of DRB have objective truth values (and, indeed, that they tell us the 
objective truth about things), we will not be entitled to believe that any discipline has shown 
the accumulation of reliable belief.9  And if we are not entitled to believe that any discipline 
has shown the accumulation of reliable belief, then (by Byrne’s lights), we cannot interpret 
any discipline realistically. 
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So can we interpret the theories of DRB realistically?  Well, following Byrne’s 
reasoning, in order to assess this question we should ask: Has DRB itself shown the 
accumulation of reliable belief? There are two ways of trying to answer this question. 
Practitioners of DRB might assume from the outset (until given reason to do otherwise) that 
the methods they employ in practicing DRB are successfully aimed at truth; and, on the basis 
of this assumption, they will likely say ‘yes, DRB has shown the accumulation of reliable 
belief’. Note, however, that these practitioners of DRB are interpreting DRB realistically, and 
they are doing so not on the basis of its success, but rather in advance of any awareness of 
its success.  Indeed, their assessment of DRB’s success depends on their realist 
interpretation of DRB.  On the other hand, practitioners of DRB might refrain from interpreting 
DRB realistically until they have independent evidence that DRB has shown the accumulation 
of reliable belief.  But this will be a long wait; for, after all, any mode of detecting whether 
DRB has shown the accumulation of reliable belief will itself fall under the scope of DRB.
The upshot, then, is this: If you can’t interpret a discipline realistically until it has shown 
the accumulation of reliable belief, then you won’t ever be able to interpret DRB realistically.  
And if you can’t interpret DRB realistically, then you can’t interpret any discipline realistically. 
But Byrne acknowledges that some disciplines can be interpreted realistically. Thus, he must 
concede that at least some disciplines can be interpreted realistically even if they haven’t 
shown the accumulation of reliable belief.  In the case of DRB, it seems, in fact, that there is a 
rational initial presumption that DRB is to be interpreted realistically, contrary to 1b above.  
And, for all we know, there might be other disciplines for which there is evidence, but of an 
entirely different sort, that supports a realist interpretation of the discipline—contrary to 1c.  
Absent 1b and 1c, however, there is no clear argument for (1).  And so Byrne’s argument 
fails—even ignoring worries about (2).
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One might object that there is no such discipline as DRB; thus, my argument against 
Byrne—which apparently rests on the supposition that there is such a discipline—fails.  I 
admit that it seems odd to characterize DRB as a discipline.  After all, it is hard to imagine 
awarding university degrees in DRB, or applying for NEH or NSF funding to pursue DRB.  
But, really, the objection does not rest in any important way upon the supposition that the 
criteria for discipline-individuation allow us to treat DRB as a discipline.  For whatever else 
DRB happens to be, it is, at the very least, a theory-building activity.  And what the argument 
just presented shows is that at least some theory-building activities must be interpreted 
realistically in the absence of the accumulation of reliable belief.  But if that is right, then the 
door is open for thinking that other theory-building activities—including, for all we know, full-
blown disciplines (whatever exactly a ‘discipline’ amounts to in Byrne’s usage) can be 
interpreted realistically in the absence of the accumulation of reliable belief.  
In closing this section, I would like to note a connection between my argument here 
and some conclusions that I have defended elsewhere. In World Without Design: The 
Ontological Consequences of Naturalism,10 I argued that, assuming we want to form beliefs 
on the basis of evidence, we cannot avoid treating at least some sources of evidence as 
basic sources, where a source is treated as basic just in case it is trusted as reliable in the 
absence of evidence for its reliability. The reason is simple:  in order to acquire or appreciate 
evidence for the claim that a source S is reliable, one must either invoke evidence from some 
distinct source S*, or one must invoke evidence from S itself.  Since we do not have infinitely 
many sources of evidence, it follows that at least one of our sources is such that some, if not 
all, of the evidence we have in support of its reliability comes from the source itself.  But in 
such a case, our disposition to trust the source precedes our having evidence for its 
reliability.  Thus, our trust in the source does not depend on the evidence—even if, in the 
end, our belief that the source is reliable does depend (circularly) on the evidence. So, 
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assuming it is rational for us to trust any of our sources of evidence as reliable, it must be 
rational to treat at least one of them as basic.  
But if all that is right, then (ceteris paribus) it will be rational to interpret realistically any 
discipline that can be practiced just by relying on basic sources, and furthermore, it will be 
rational to do so in advance of any evidence of success.  Suppose, for example, we 
(rationally) treat source S as basic.  Then, from our point of view, source S is a reliable
source of evidence.  Other things being equal, then, it will be rational for us to form beliefs on 
the basis of evidence garnered from source S.  In other words, propositions supported by 
evidence from S will be fitting objects of belief for us.  But then, of course, it follows that 
(ceteris paribus—i.e., absent counterevidence from other sources, strange circumstances, 
and so on ) the conclusions of any discipline that can be practiced just by relying on S will be 
fitting objects for belief.  In other words, it will be rational for us to believe those conclusions 
as expressions of the literal, objective truth about the world.  Thus, by definition, it will be 
rational for us to interpret the discipline realistically. 
Of course, one might try to oppose realism in theology or metaphysics by arguing that 
these disciplines inevitably rely on evidence from sources that are not rationally treated as 
basic, or by arguing that they are in some other way defective; but those would be very 
different arguments, and ones that have yet to appear in the literature in any sort of 
developed form.
2. VAN FRAASSEN
I now want to turn to a different sort of challenge:  an objection to the very enterprise of 
metaphysics that, if sound, carries over to theology as well.  The objection is raised by Bas 
van Fraassen in the opening chapter of The Empirical Stance.
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According to van Fraassen, analytic ontology—which, for purposes here, I am taking 
to be identical to the discipline of metaphysics—aims to answer questions that science 
doesn't ask, and to do so in the same way that science answers its questions.  What does 
this mean exactly?  Primarily, it means that metaphysicians posit things to do explanatory 
work, and then they try to justify the acceptance of their explanatory posits by appeal to the 
sorts of virtues that justify the acceptance of scientific explanations—not virtues like 
predictive success and increased ability to control nature, however; rather, virtues like 
explanatory power, simplicity, elegance, conservatism, and the like. (For convenience, I shall 
refer to the latter sorts of virtues as ‘explanatory virtues’.  In doing so, however, I do not mean 
to make any presuppositions about whether or to what extent the virtues that I am calling 
‘explanatory’ can be distinguished from putatively non-explanatory virtues like empirical 
adequacy; nor do I mean to make any presuppositions about whether the allegedly different 
explanatory virtues can be distinguished from one another.)
Thus construed, analytic ontology is open to two objections. 
The first objection is that relevant differences between science and ontology cast 
doubt on the justification for accepting the ontologist’s explanatory posits. Van Fraassen lays 
out the objection as follows:
You will have understood me correctly if you now see science and analytic 
ontology caught in a Pascalian wager…. If the wager is on a choice of theories or 
hypotheses, then from a God’s-eye view, success consists in selecting the true 
and failure in choosing the false….As in all success and failure, however, 
although there is value in winning as such, there are also collateral value and 
damage that win and loss bring along with them.  … In science, the stakes are 
great for all of us: safety, food, shelter, communication, all the preconditions for 
life in peace and justice that a successful science can enhance.  The risk of 
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acquiring some false beliefs matters little in comparison.  Most important for us, 
here, the acquisition of false beliefs by itself, apart from their practical empirical 
consequences, is no great matter in its contrast class of practical risk and gain.
That is very far from how it is in metaphysics.  There the gains to be 
contemplated are those of having true beliefs…and of being in a position to 
explain…. The risk is precisely that of acquiring false beliefs. …  Where is the 
metaphysician who shows us how likely it is that inference to the best 
explanation in ontology will lead to true conclusions?  Why is he or she missing?  
Where is the metaphysician who makes the case that the gain of explanatory 
power outweighs the risk of ending up with a tissue of falsehoods? (15 – 16; 
emphasis mine)
The argument, in sum, seems just to be this: False belief, as such, is to be avoided; and 
there is no evidence that explanatory virtues lead us to true belief.  Thus, we are justified (if at 
all, one might add) in forming beliefs on the basis of best-explanation arguments only if the 
gain from doing so outweighs the risk. In science, we might have a case for the conclusion 
that gain outweighs risk; but not in metaphysics.11 Thus, absent some argument for the 
conclusion that inference to the best explanation in metaphysics is likely to lead us to the 
truth (and given that there is something rather absurd about constructing metaphysical 
theories while at the same time withholding belief in them and suspending judgment about 
their explanatory status), one ought not to engage in metaphysics at all.
Of course, one might note that there are arguments in the literature for the conclusion 
that explanatory virtues are truth-indicative. But such arguments typically focus on the status 
of explanatory virtues as criteria for theory choice in science rather than metaphysics; and, 
more importantly, they typically reason from the premise that this or that feature of science is 
hard to explain apart from the assumption that choosing theories on the basis of certain 
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explanatory virtues is a reliable way of reaching the truth to the conclusion that, therefore, the 
assumption in question is true. But according to van Fraassen, the demand for explanations 
is precisely what good empiricists aim to resist.12  In other words: If one is already committed 
to the metaphysical enterprise, one will take seriously the demand for explanation, and, in 
doing so, one may well be led to the conclusion that choosing theories on the basis of their 
explanatory power (among other virtues) is a reliable way of getting to the truth.  But if the 
question is why we should be committed to the metaphysical enterprise in the first place, then 
arguments that presuppose a need for explaining things will be impotent. Thus, the empiricist 
will be completely unmoved by the usual arguments for the claim that explanatory virtues are 
truth-indicative.
But, one might wonder, why should metaphysicians care whether empiricists are 
moved by replies to their objections?  As it turns out, I think that they should not care; and I 
think that, in the end, van Fraassen’s objections against metaphysics are, at best, grumblings 
that express the empiricist distaste for metaphysics but that will not and should not convince 
the unconvinced that the distaste ought to be shared.  Showing this, however, will take a bit 
of argument—argument that is best left until after van Fraassen’s second objection has been 
presented. 
The second objection is that the procedure of explanation via theoretical posit results 
in the creation of “simulacra” which then replace the real things that we aim to be theorizing 
about and thereby make our theoretical activity into an idle exercise in wordplay.  So, for 
example, van Fraassen argues that when philosophers ask the question “Does the world 
exist,” what they inevitably do is to make the question rigorous with technical definitions of 
‘world’ and related terms that map on to some but not nearly all uses of the term ‘world’ and 
then stipulate that the world exists if, and only if, the world as they have defined it exists.  He 
notes that one might just as well introduce a new technical term—‘Sworld’, for example—and 
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then ask whether the Sworld exists.  The trouble, of course, is that we wouldn’t really care 
about the answer—unless we had reason to think that “the world exists” means the same 
thing as “the Sworld exists”.  But therein lies the rub; for, after all, it doesn’t, exactly.  As van 
Fraassen puts it:
“Sworld” is intelligibly related to “world,” taking over a carefully selected family of 
uses, regimenting them, an is then used to make new, logically contingent, fully 
intelligible assertions.  If we are careful not to let other usages of “world” creep 
back into our professional discourse, then “the world exists” is a perfectly good 
way of saying “the Sworld exists.”  
The unfortunate negative verdict forced on us by this…line of reasoning, 
which grants sufficiency to such lenient standards [of meaningfulness], is that it is 
very easy, all too easy, to make sense.  We can sit in our closets and in a 
perfectly meaningful way, kneading and manipulating the language, create new 
theories of everything and thereby important contributions to ontology.  In other 
words, to put it a little more bluntly, this “word play” we [are engaged in] is merely 
idle world play; although shown to be meaningful, it is merely idle world play 
nevertheless. (27)
In sum, then, ontologists who try to answer the question “Does the world exist?” in the way 
just described inevitably replace talk of the world with talk of a simulacrum—the Sworld.  But 
the simulacrum isn’t what we care about when we ask the question the ontologist is trying to 
answer; and so the ontologist is engaged in a project that is somewhat removed from our real 
interests and concerns.
So go van Fraassen’s objections against metaphysics.  I’ll consider responses in a 
moment; but first I want to comment briefly on how these objections might carry over to 
theology.  It is clear that van Fraassen thinks that they do—or, at any rate, that they carry 
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over to some kinds of theology—for some of the examples he uses are examples drawn from 
the philosophy of religion.  I take it that, as applied to theology, the objections are just these:  
(a) there are no empirically detectable payoffs for the procedure of explanation by theoretical 
posit in theology, and (b) the God that is talked about in that part of theology that resembles 
or overlaps with analytic philosophy of religion is a simulacrum—either different from the real 
God, or else simply stipulated to be identical to the real God.  Obviously not all of theology is 
indicted by these objections.  But at least two kinds probably will be: so-called perfect being 
theology, an approach adopted by many medieval and contemporary analytic philosophers 
that attributes properties to God (such as simplicity and changelessness) on the basis of 
intuitions about perfection; and systematic and philosophical theology, at least insofar as 
these activities involve a certain amount of explanatory postulation in the effort to build 
detailed theories out of the data provided by divine revelation and religious experience. And, 
again, the objection will be that perfect being theology results in the creation of a simulacrum 
(one which privileges for theological purposes the characterization of God as perfect over 
characterizations of God as our parent, our employer, our shepherd, and so on), and that the 
explanations offered by systematic theology have no payoffs that outweigh the risks 
associated with treating explanatory power as a theoretical virtue.
But now what shall we think of these objections? Let us begin with the “simulacrum” 
objection.  And here, I think, it will be helpful to begin by considering a rather simpleminded 
response to van Fraassen.  The objection, again, is that metaphysicians aren’t talking about 
things that we care about:  they talk about the Sworld rather than the world; they talk about 
the God of the philosophers rather than about God; and so on.  But, one might wonder, how 
do we know that the Sworld isn’t the world?  How do we know that the God of the 
philosophers isn’t God?  How, in other words, do we know that these things are just 
simulacra?  It seems, in fact, that we can’t know unless we already have a metaphysical story 
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to tell about the nature of the world or about the nature of God.  But, of course, to have a 
metaphysical story to tell, we’d have to do some metaphysics.  
But the response isn’t quite right. It’s not true that the only way to know that you’ve 
constructed a simulacrum is by comparing the object of your discourse with the real thing.  
The other way to know that you’ve constructed a simulacrum is by knowing that constructing 
simulacra is pretty much all you can do.  And here, I think, we start to get at the real objection 
in van Fraassen’s text.  As I see it, the concern is just this:  Metaphysicians are in the 
business of offering explanations by postulate.  We postulate definitions, entities, properties, 
and the like; and we use our postulates to build theories that explain the world to us. Our 
postulates are by their very nature props and models—“simulacra”, if you will, that may or 
may not manage to represent the things they are about in a full and accurate way. And—this 
is the concern—precisely because we have no evidence that explanation by postulate is a 
reliable way of reaching the truth, we have no way of knowing the extent to which simulacra 
represent the things that they are about.  To the extent, then, that we try to force our talk 
about (say) God or the world to conform to our idea of the God of the philosophers or of the 
Sworld, we change the subject from something we know and recognize to something that, for 
all we know, may be (and probably is) at best a shadow of the thing we actually care about.
3. TWO STANCES
Suppose we grant that the, or a, defining characteristic of analytic metaphysics (and of 
certain theological enterprises as well) is a willingness to engage in explanation by theoretical 
postulate. How shall we address the skeptical worry raised at the end of the previous 
section—the worry, in short, that we have no evidence that the methods of metaphysics are 
reliable and therefore we have no reason to think that the simulacra we construct bear any 
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important relation to the things we care about?  The answer, so I shall argue, just depends on 
which of two “stances” we adopt: the empirical stance or the metaphysical stance.
According to van Fraassen, empiricism is a philosophical position that involves, in 
addition to a familiar sort of respect for science, empirical investigation, un-dogmatic 
theorizing, and the like, the following two values, tendencies, or attitudes:
a) a rejection of demands for explanation at certain crucial points, and
b) a strong dissatisfaction with explanations (even if called for) that proceed by 
postulation.
It is (a) and (b), he thinks, that separates empiricists from metaphysicians. Moreover, 
empiricism, on his view, is not a belief or a philosophical thesis.  Rather, it is a stance:  an 
“attitude, commitment, approach, a cluster of such—possibly including some propositional 
attitudes such as beliefs as well.” (48 – 9)  To adopt empiricism, or the empirical stance, then, 
is to adopt the characteristic attitudes, commitments, and so on of the empiricist tradition—
including (a) and (b).  And we might go on to say that, in contrast with the empirical stance 
there is also a metaphysical stance—a stance characterized in part by a willingness to 
embrace demands for explanation and to be satisfied with explanations that proceed by 
postulation.
So far as I can tell, those who adopt the empirical stance can have no answer to van 
Fraassen’s objections against metaphysics.  We have already conceded for the sake of 
argument that metaphysics involves offering explanations by postulation; and, so far as I can 
tell, apart from the sorts of explanatory arguments already in the literature, there is no 
argument forthcoming for the conclusion that selecting theories on the basis of explanatory 
virtues is, in general, a reliable way of reaching the truth.  And, of course, explanatory 
arguments will be of no use in persuading an empiricist to take metaphysics seriously; for 
those are precisely the sorts of arguments of which empiricists are most suspicious. From 
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within the empirical stance, then, it is hard to find any resources for answering van 
Fraassen’s objections.
On the other hand, the objections are readily answerable from within the metaphysical 
stance. Indeed, those who adopt the metaphysical stance may simply adapt the reply I 
offered to Byrne.  We know that some sources of evidence have to be taken as basic.  Even 
the empiricist must acknowledge as much for, lest she fall into global skepticism, she will be 
forced to take at least sense perception and logical reasoning as basic sources. But then why 
not take the methods and sources of evidence employed by metaphysicians as basic sources 
as well?  There are, to be sure, arguments in the literature for the conclusion that some of 
these sources—intuition, for example—are unreliable or unworthy of being treated as basic 
sources.  But, notoriously, these arguments are not decisive—in no small part because (as is 
often pointed out) it seems impossible to run the arguments without presupposing the 
reliability of intuition.  In any case, however, they are not the arguments that van Fraassen 
has offered; and to the extent that his objections depend on them, they are all the weaker for 
that dependency. My suggestion, then, is that van Fraassen’s skepticism about metaphysics 
ought to be treated in precisely the way that Byrne’s theological skepticism ought to be 
treated:  both are rightly ignored.
Matters would be different, of course, if there could be some argument for the 
conclusion that it is more rational to adopt the empirical stance than to adopt the 
metaphysical stance.  Is there such an argument?  More pertinently, is there any such 
argument that those who have already adopted the metaphysical stance will be rationally 
bound to accept?  It is hard to see how there could be.  For, after all, the two stances are 
distinguished in part by different views about what constitutes good argument and rational 
theorizing; and, unless the standards and sources characteristic of the metaphysical stance 
are self-defeating, there is no reason to think that those adopting the metaphysical stance 
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ought to be persuaded by empiricist arguments for the conclusion that it is irrational to adopt 
the metaphysical stance.  And so far as I am aware, there is no argument forthcoming for the 
conclusion that the standards and sources characteristic of the metaphysical stance are self-
defeating.  At any rate, no such argument has been offered by Byrne or van Fraassen. 
Interestingly, van Fraassen does seem to have a pragmatic argument for adopting the 
empirical stance.  The pragmatic argument is just his first objection against metaphysics:  
namely, that the payoff we gain from believing the theories we choose on the basis of 
explanatory virtues is too small to offset the risk of false belief.  In fact, however, the 
pragmatic argument seems unsound.  Granted, food, shelter, and safety are not at stake in 
metaphysics.  But other things are.13 Metaphysics impinges on morality; it also impinges on 
our very conception of ourselves.  Are we free?  If not, does it follow that we are not morally 
responsible? Can a person existing now be the same person as one existing a thousand 
years from now?  If not, as Derek Parfit seems to suppose, is there any point in taking 
steps—as both scientists and religious believers do in various different ways—to try to 
significantly prolong our lives? The list of questions might well go on; and to the extent that 
our metaphysical views do impinge upon our moral lives and upon our self-conception, they 
will impact our intellectual and emotional lives, our social interactions, and a variety of other 
aspects of life.  Indeed, many religious believers have thought that one’s metaphysical 
beliefs—particularly one’s theological beliefs—make the difference between eternity in 
heaven and eternity in hell.  For those who think this, the risk of false belief and reward of 
true belief rise exponentially.  So, contrary to what van Fraassen argues, false belief in 
metaphysics can be a serious risk; true belief can be an important reward.  And the reward of 
getting it right might well justify taking the risk.
Van Fraassen will almost certainly be unmoved by the response just offered on behalf 
of metaphysics.  But really that doesn’t matter.  For plenty of people will be moved.  That is , 
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plenty of people will agree that the potential reward of true belief in metaphysics does
outweigh the risk. And for those people, there will be ample pragmatic justification for 
adopting the metaphysical stance.     
4. CONCLUSION
In this paper I have examined two objections against realism in theology and 
metaphysics, and I have concluded that practitioners of metaphysics and theology ought 
simply to ignore these objections. In a very important sense, both objections are simply 
instances of “preaching to the choir”.  Those who are already skeptical of theology or 
metaphysics or both will find in the objections plenty to agree with.  But they should not 
convince the unconvinced.  
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NOTES
                                                     
1 By ‘theology’ in the present context I have primarily in mind those sub-disciplines of theology that go by such 
labels as ‘systematic theology’, ‘dogmatic theology’, ‘philosophical theology’, and the like.  The arguments of this 
paper do not (to my mind, anyway) have any obvious bearing on (say) historical and biblical theology or the 
various kinds of biblical criticism that are practiced in contemporary theology departments.
2 Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate, 2003.
3 New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002.
4 God and Realism, p. 162.
5 On p. 159, Byrne offers what might appear as an outright definition of what it is to interpret a discipline of 
thought realistically.  He says:  “We have reached the conclusion that to interpret a discipline of thought 
realistically is to see its evolving conclusions as the outcome of real-world influences.”  (159)  But, of course, this 
offers us nothing by way of precision; for, after all, superstitions, prejudices, fears and ambitions, peer pressure 
and other sociological influences, and so on are all “real-world influences”.  Every discipline—from biology and 
chemistry on the one hand to astrology and iridology on the other—is such that its “evolving conclusions” are the 
outcomes of “real-world influences”.   But, of course, this can’t be what Byrne has in mind.  To find out what he 
has in mind, however, we have to look elsewhere and then offer a gloss; and my own view is that if we do this, 
and if we do it in the most charitable way possible, we arrive at something like the gloss that I have just offered. 
6 Note, however, that this definition of reliable belief leaves open the possibility that reliable beliefs in one 
discipline might be contradicted by reliable beliefs in another discipline. If we were looking for sufficient 
conditions for the realistic interpretation of a discipline, we would want to rule this out.  But since Byrne is 
concerned to show that theology fails to meet a necessary condition for being interpreted realistically, I doubt 
that this problem will cause much trouble for present purposes.  
7 Moreover, even the revisionists in the Presbyterian camp will likely agree on permanence of conditional claims 
to the effect that, given an appropriately strong view of the inspiration and infallibility of the Bible, the doctrines 
expressed in the Nicene Creed, the Westminster Confession, and various other doctrinal standards are true.
8 Is it really fair, though, to treat official Catholic theology, or traditional, orthodox Presbyterian theology as 
disciplines in their own right, rather than as branches of a single discipline—theology?  It is hard to see why not; 
but, in the end, nothing hinges on treating them as such.  For surely Byrne would not countenance this sort of 
reply to his argument:  “Granted, we cannot interpret theology realistically.  But that doesn’t matter; for all I claim 
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is that we can interpret the distinct theory-building enterprise of Catholic theology realistically.”  But so far as I 
can tell, the only argument he has against this reply is an adapted version of the argument currently under 
discussion:  i.e., a theory-building enterprise can be interpreted realistically only if it shows the accumulation of 
reliable belief; but in these various theory-building enterprises there has been no accumulation of reliable belief.  
If this is the argument he would use, then my reply is as above: these theory-building enterprises have shown 
the accumulation of reliable belief after all.
9 Suppose you think that some claim of DRB has a truth value, but that the truth value is not objective.  Thus, 
suppose you think something like this:  “It is true, but only true-for-me, that B1 – Bn are reliable beliefs in 
discipline D.”  Given our understanding of reliable belief, this would seem to be equivalent to the view that you, 
but not necessarily anyone else, can rationally expect that B1 – Bn will be permanently sanctioned parts of D’s 
theoretical apparatus.  But isn’t this claim self-undermining?  Note that the claim isn’t equivalent to the (perhaps 
perfectly sensible) claim that you have evidence E that (for all you know) nobody else has, and that given this, it 
is objectively rational for you (but not necessarily for anyone lacking E) to believe that B1 – Bn will be 
permanently sanctioned parts of D’s theoretical apparatus.  Rather, if it is really only true-for-you that B1 – Bn 
are reliable beliefs in D, the idea is that even people in your same epistemic position might not rationally be able 
to expect that B1 – Bn will be permanently sanctioned by D.  But this fact by itself counts as good reason to 
question whether practitioners of D will continue to sanction B1 – Bn.  Thus, in affirming that it is only true for 
you that B1 – Bn can rationally be expected to be permanently sanctioned by D, you acquire a defeater for the 
belief that B1 – Bn will always be sanctioned by D; and so it becomes irrational for you to expect that B1 – Bn 
will be permanently sanctioned by D.  
10 Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002.
11 Here I take it that van Fraassen is suspending, for the sake of argument, his view—defended at length in The 
Scientific Image (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1980)—that explanation is not the aim of science, and that believing 
that scientific theories provide true explanations is to take an objectionably metaphysical view of science.
12 On this, see (for example) van Fraassen’s reply to Richard Boyd in Paul Churchland & Clifford Hooker (eds.) 
Images of Science (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1985).
13 Some of the points here, particularly the point about free will, are borrowed from Alicia Finch’s discussion of 
van Fraassen’s objection in her review of The Empirical Stance (ACPQ 77 2003) 
